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CARTWRIGHT V. UNITED STATES: THE CLEAR RING
OF COMMON SENSE
The Supreme Court of the United States in a May 8, 1973 decision invali-
dated a 1963 Treasury regulation which attempted to value mutual fund shares
for estate tax purposes at the public offering price rather than the lower redemp-
tion price.' The Court in Cartwright v. United Sttates held that the regulation
in question was "manifestly inconsistent with the most elementary provisions of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 and ... (operated) without regard for
the market in mutual fund shares that the Act created and regulates."' 2
This article is an attempt to examine the historical background of the
Cartwright decision, analyze both the taxpayer and Government arguments,
study the rationale of the Court's holding, and finally, suggest the long- and
short-term implications of the case.
I. History of the Regulation
Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8(b) was formulated in 1963 in response
to a controversy that had erupted during the early 1960's over the proper method
of valuation of mutual fund shares for estate tax purposes.3
Originally the Internal Revenue Service had not established a definitive
policy in this area and taxpayers were using any one of three methods in valuat-
ing their mutual fund shares: bid price, ask price, or the mean between the
two." However, the Service began requiring taxpayers to use either the ask or
mean price method, which resulted in a number of taxpayer suits. This, in turn,
led to the formulation of Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8(b) which provided
that the fund shares were to be valued at the ask price exclusively.' Needless to
say, further taxpayer suits resulted and the stage was set for judicial resolution
of the dispute.
Normally the executor for the decedent's estate would report the value of
the mutual fund shares of the decedent at their redemption price. The Commis-
sioner of the Internal Revenue Service would then assess a deficiency based upon
his valuation of the same shares at the public offering (or asked) price. Then
the executor would pay the deficiency and file a timely claim for a refund. When
the refund claim was denied, he would bring action in the appropriate federal
district court, arguing that the valuation based on TreasuryRegulation § 20.2031-
8(b) was unrealistic and unreasonable.' In some instances the district court
1 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546 (1973).
2 Id. at 557.
3 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(b) (1963) provides in part:
The fair market value of a share in an open-end investment company (commonly
known as a "mutual fund") is the public offering price of a share, adjusted for any
reduction in price available to the public in acquiring the number of shares being
valued.
4 Wilkins, The Supreme Court's Cartwright Decision: Does It Signal New Valuation Dis-
putes?, 39 J. TAXATION 2, 4 (1973).
5 Id.
6 Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 567
(2d Cir. 1972).
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would agree and hold the regulation invalid with the court of appeals affirming.'
In other instances the district court would determine that the Commissioner
had acted reasonably and that the regulation was valid, again the court of
appeals affirming.' Faced with the conflict among several of the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.9
II. Mutual Fund Operations
Most business corporations will use common stock to elicit capital funds
from investors to develop their products or implement their services. After the
initial sale of these shares to the public, the shares are usually transferred in the
securities market from one individual to another. Normally the corporation is
not a participant in these subsequent transactions." Business organizations that
do participate in these subsequent transactions include open-end investment
companies, popularly referred to as "mutual funds."" Mutual funds are finan-
cial institutions that issue their shares to the public and invest the proceeds pri-
marily in the securities of other corporations. 2 The funds, which are regulated
by the Investment Company Act of 1940, may offer their shares to the public
continuously but are required to be prepared to redeem outstanding shares at
any time.
13
Mutual funds offer the individual investor a chance to participate in a
single fund having a large investment diversification thus providing him with
greater financial stability and protection than he might otherwise have with in-
dividual securities. 4 The funds also provide the investor with professional invest-
ment expertise:
... to take advantage of fluctuations in market values of the fund's invest-
ments, and . . .provide special privileges and services, such as dividend
7 Davis v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 460 F.2d 769 (9th
Cir. 1972); Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d
567 (2d Cir. 1972); Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474 (D. Colo. 1971), appeal pending
in the tenth circuit, No. 72-1360.
8 Estate of Wells v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 871 (1968); aff'd sub nom., Ruehlmann v.
Comm'r, 418 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 reh. denied, 400
U.S. 856 (1970). The companion gift tax regulation was upheld in Howell v. United States,
290 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1969).
There have only been a handful of cases concerning the validity of these Treasury regula-
tions and even these have tended to rely on each other for support of their arguments. One
commentator has noted the chronological order of some of the opinions and their "snowball"
effect:
Wells was the first opinion. Then Howell was decided based on the logic of Wells.
Finally, Wells was affirmed in Ruehlmann, but that opinion cited Howell as its
authority. It seems that Wells is the pivotal case and Howell and Ruehlmann simply
reinforce themselves by ultimate reliance on Wells.
Note, Estate Tax Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares: Is Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8(b)
Reasonable?, 6 CREIGHTON L. REV. 79 (1972).
9 Cartwright v. United States, 409 U.S. 840 (1972).
10 Comment, Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares for Federal Estate Tax Purposes, 14 B.C.
IxD. & Com. L. REv. 134, 136 (1972).
11 Note, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 736, 742
(1969) ; see also Note, 6 CRVETGTON L. REv., supra note 8, at 74 n.2.
12 Comment, 14 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv., supra note 10, at 136.
13 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (1970).
14 Note, 44 NOTRE DAME LArYER, supra note 11, at 741.
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reinvestment plans without sales charges, periodic investment plans, retire-
ment plans for self-employed, and periodic remittance plans.35
The investor's funds are invested by the funds in other securities in exchange for
a pro rata interest in the assets of the fund. 6 Normally the funds will employ
an underwriter to market the shares in return for a sales fee."
There are two prices involved in the trading of these mutual funds: a
redemption (or "bid") price and a public offering (or "ask") price. The bid
price is the price a shareholder would normally receive based upon the fractional
value per share of the net assets of the mutual fund at the time of redemption.'"
The ask price, on the other hand, is the price at which the fund offers its shares
on the public market. The ask price consists of two elements: the net asset
value per share at the time of the sale and the sales charge (or "sales load") of
the fund's underwriter." The net asset value is calculated on the New York
Stock Exchange twice a day by subtracting the total outstanding liabilities from
the total assets and dividing by the number of mutual fund shares outstanding.
2
The sales charge is usually a percentage of the public offering price, but this
percentage may vary depending upon the size of the transaction.2 '
A couple of features of this dual price structure bear special mention at this
time. First, the bid and ask prices do not correspond to the "high" and "low"
prices normally associated with the daily trading in a common stock; rather they
are the specific "buy" and "sell" prices at which all transactions in the particular
fund take place. 2 Second, a tax valuation based on the public offering price
will yield a higher tax than a similar valuation based on the redemption price;
the underwriter's sales charge accounts for the difference.22 It is this "discrep-
ancy" that is the source of the controversy in Cartwright v. United States.
Private trading in mutual fund shares is virtually non-existent despite the fact
there are no legal restrictions on the transferability of these shares. 4 The normal
process of redemption involves a sale back to the mutual fund which is required
to repurchase the shares upon demand, paying the net asset value without the
original sales load.2" This guaranteed redemption feature provides greater liquid-
ity which, in turn, increases the marketability of the shares.2 6
15 Annot., 11 A.L.R. FED. 940, 945 (1973).
16 Note, 44 NOTRE DAME- LAWYER, supra note 11, at 740.
17 Id. at 883.
18 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 547 (1973).
19 Id.
20 Comment, Estate and Gift Tax Valuation of Mutual Funds: The Mythical Market
Value for Shareholders, 10 HOuST. L. Rlv. 463 (1973).
21 W. CASEY, MUTUAL FuND DEsK Boox 34 (1965). These commissions generally
ranged from 7.5 to 8.5 percent of the public offering price to as low as 1.0 percent, depending
upon the size of the purchase. There are also a number of so-called "no-load" mutual funds
which offer their shares for sale at net asset value without a sales charge. Cartwright v. United
States, 411 U.S. 546, 548 n.3 (1973).
22 Comment, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rav., supra note 10, at 137.
23 Comment, 10 HousT. L. Rnv., supra note 20, at 464.
24 'Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate of Wells v.
Comm'r, 50 T.C. 871, 872-73 "(1968). This phenomenon can be largely attributed to the
fact that not only the fund underwriter but also all other dealers must sell at the current public
offering price. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22(d), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d) (1970).
25 Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 771 (W.D.N.Y. 1971); Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2 (a) (32), -22(a) (1) (1970).
26 Note, 6 CREIGHTON L. RiV., supra note 8, at 85.
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A tax valuation of mutual fund shares based on the controversial Treasury
regulations causes no difficulty for the living investor because his gain or loss on
a sale is measured by the original ask price and the bid price he receives at the
time of sale." However, the system does not work so well for the decedent's
estate because Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8(b) requires the executor to
report the mutual funds shares at the ask price for estate tax purposes although
if the estate were to sell the shares at that time, it could only realize the bid
price.r
III. Summary of Arguments and the Court's Reaction
A. Willing Buyer-Willing Seller Test
Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-1 (b) attempts to provide guidelines as to
the valuation of estate property in general.2 9 The regulation specifies that prop-
erty includible in the decedent's gross estate is to be valued at its fair market
value at the time of the decedent's death. Further, the test for fair market value
is to be that of a willing buyer and a willing seller and the price at which the
property would change hands if both parties had a reasonable knowledge of the
facts of the transaction.
The "willing buyer-willing seller" test was not at issue in the Cartwright
case, as the Supreme Court itself noted, "[This] test of fair market value is nearly
as old as the federal income, estate and gift taxes themselves, and is not chal-
lenged here."3 What was at issue was the interpretation of the test in a particular
situation. Very frequently the practical realities of valuation are lost in a laby-
rinth of conceptually appealing, but very theoretical, arguments."1 The area of
mutual fund valuation for estate tax purposes has proven no exception.
Since the implementation of Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8(b) in 1963,
the Internal Revenue Service has argued that the original sales of mutual fund
27 Id. at 75.
28 Id.
29 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1958), as amended, Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1965),
provides in part:
The value of every item of property includible in a decedent's gross estate . . . is
its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death .. . (unless an alternate date
is used). The fair market value is the price at which the property would change
hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compul-
sion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts....
The fair market value of a particular item of property includible . . . is not to be
determined by a forced sales price. Nor is . . . (it) to be determined by the sales
price of the item in a market other than that in which such item is most commonly
sold to the public .... Thus, in the case of an (includible) item of property . ..,
which is generally obtained by the public in the retail market, the fair market value
of such an item . . . is the price at which the item or a comparable item would be
sold at retail.
The Government attempted through the 1965 amendment to establish that retail
price should represent the fair market value of all items generally sold at retail, in-
cluding household effects, personal effects as well as mutual fund shares.
Id., T.D. 6826. Cum. BULL. 367 (1965).
30 411 U.S. at 551.
31 See Note, Valuation of Shares in Open-End Investment Companies for Federal Estate
Tax Purposes Held To Be Replacement Cost, 44 N.Y.U. L. RIv. 416, 422 (1969).
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shares are the ones to be determinative of fair market value.3 2 The Commissioner
contended that the willing buyer-willing seller test should be applied to the
public offering price, rather than the lower redemption price, because in the
latter situation the mutual fund was required by statute to redeem the shares
upon demand and thus could hardly be considered a "willing" buyer; 3 and as
noted earlier, the only practical means of disposal of the mutual fund shares is a
resale from the investor back to the mutual fund.34 Therefore, the mutual fund
shares are properly valued at the public offering or ask price.35
However, the Commissioner's position has received heavy criticism both in
and out of court. The American Bar Association Committee on Estate and Gift
Taxes has criticized Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8(b) as being a departure
from the fair market value concept envisioned by the willing buyer-willing seller
test. 6 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing the Cartwright case,
noted:
[O]ther factors can affect the price which a willing seller reasonably could
expect to receive from a sale of that particular unit, and if these other fac-
tors cause the retail price to be an unreasonable or unrealistic value stand-
ard, the retail price has not always been followed in valuation disputes as
the sole criterion of value.
37
In support of their contention that the willing buyer-willing seller test should be
applied to the redemption price, some taxpayers have argued that the proper
way to view mutual fund transactions is as an overall sales contract providing for
an investor to buy at one price (including a sales load) and to sell at another
price (without a sales load) ." The district court in Hicks v. United States con-
cluded that such a contract was thoroughly consistent with the willing buyer-
willing seller test:
The "willing buyer" is the fully informed person who agrees to buy the
shares, agreeing at that time to sell them to the fund-the only available
purchaser-at the redemption price. The "willing seller" is the fund which
sells the shares at market value plus a load charge, and which agrees to buy
the shares back at market less the load charge. That is the market, and it
is the only market. It is a market made up of informed buyers and an in-
formed seller, all dealing at arm's length. 9
Other courts maintained that the willing buyer-willing seller test had to be
32 Estate of Wells v. Conm'r, 50 T.C. 871, 876 (1968).
33 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1973).
34 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
35 Estate of Wells v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 871, 876 (1968); Howell v. United States,
414 F.2d 45, 48 (7th Cir. 1969); Ruehlman v. Commr, 418 F.2d 1302, 1304 (6th Cir.
1969).
36 Thatcher, Valuation of Mutual Funds for Federal Estate Tax Purposes, 48 L.A.B.
BULL. 24, 25 (1972).
37 457 F.2d at 571; see also Note, 6 CREIGHTON L. Rxv., supra note 8, at 80.
38 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 552 (1973); Hicks v. United States, 335 F.
Supp. 474, 481 (D. Colo. 1971); see also the district court's opinion in Cartwright v. United
States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1971); Comment, 10 HOUST. L. Rav., supra note
20, at 468.
39 335 F. Supp. at 481; Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1972).
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modified slightly for mutual fund transactions because of their dual pricing
structure.40 Practically speaking, there were three parties to the transaction: the
seller receiving the bid price, the buyer paying the ask price, and the mutual fund
mediating the exchange.4 Within such a framework the estate should be treated
as the "willing seller."'42 The rationale for this interpretation is relatively straight-
forward. Upon the death of the decedent the property goes into the hands of
the estate, which acquires a power of disposition. 3 In the normal course of
events a large portion of the estate's assets may be liquidated to meet the cost
of death taxes and administrative expenses or to effect distribution of the estate."
The Supreme Court in Cartwright endorsed the Hicks interpretation of the
applicability of the willing buyer-willing seller test because in light of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 the redemption price may be properly viewed as the
final step in a voluntary transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
5
B. Bundle of Rights Theory
The Government attempted to overcome the effect of the willing buyer-
willing seller argument offered by the taxpayers by putting forth an analogy of
its own-the "bundle of rights" theory.48 This argument was made most force-
fully in a series of 1941 Supreme Court cases beginning with Guggenheim v.
Rasquin, which held that the cash surrender value of a single-premium life in-
surance policy did not necessarily represent its only taxable value for estate tax
purposes. 47 The owner of such a policy had additional rights, such as the right
to retain the policy for its investment virtues as well as the right of the beneficiary
to the face amount of the policy upon the insured's death.48  Because this
"bundle of rights" is so difficult to give a realistic value to, the courts are willing
to defer to the Commissioner's estimation and permit valuation to be based on the
replacement cost as reasonable evidence of the value.49 It has been argued that
the rationale underlying this approach is that:
40 Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1972); Cartwright v. United
States, 457 F.2d 567, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1972).
41 Note, Treasury Regulation Valuing Mutual Fund Shares for Estate Tax Purposes as the
Replacement Cost Held Invalid, 21 BUFFALO L. RV. 256, 264, (1971).
42 Id. at 265.
43 Note, Treasury Regulation Section 20.2031-8(b) Invalid-Mutual Fund Shares
Valued at Redemption Price for Estate Tax Purposes, 23 VAND. L. Rv. 898, 902 (1970),
citing 2 BONBRIOHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 695 (1937).
44 Id.
45 411 U.S. at 552.
46 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 554 (1973).
47 Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941); Powers v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 259
(1941); United States v. Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941). A similar logical analysis has been
employed in a number of jewelry valuation cases, such as Estate of Gould, 14 T.C. 414 (1950)
where the Tax Court held that for gift tax purposes the value of an item of jewelry includes
the excise tax since the donee would have had to pay the tax had he purchased the same ring.
48 Wilkins, 39 J. TAXATION, supra note 4, at 2. The cash surrender value will grow
steadily after the initial purchase until it eventually will exceed the original cost of the policy,
but it will never become as great as the cost of duplicating the policy at that point in time,
because the cost of coverage increases as the individual grows older. Comment, 14 B.C. IND.
& Com. L. REv., supra note 10, at 139.
49 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); see Guggenheim v. Rasquin,
312 U.S. 254, 257-58 (1941). The cash surrender value is not the most realistic measure of
value, because it involves the elimination of the future rights which ordinarily account for the
difference between the cash surrender value and the replacement cost. Comment, 14 B.C.
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[W]hen the price which individuals are willing to pay in order to acquire
an asset is in excess of the asset's liquidation value in the hands of the public,
the asset must possess an element of value in addition to its liquidation value
which, in the opinions of the purchasers, justifies the difference between
that value and the cost of acquisition. 50
The Commissioner has asserted that the "bundle of iights" theory can be
extended to mutual fund shares because of inherent future characteristics similar
to those of the single-premium life insurance policy. 1 The dissent in the Cart-
wright case supported the Commissioner's position, noting that redemption at
net asset value was only one of a number of rights incident to the ownership of
mutual fund shares that the decedent's estate acquired: the right to normal
dividends and capital gains; other rights acquired were the right to further share
purchases below the public offering price, and the right to exchange shares in one
fund for another fund managed by the same corporation (without a sales load) .
Other future benefits include diversification of investment and continual pro-
fessional investment supervision on the part of the mutual fund.53
As further evidence of the reasonableness of the regulations the Commis-
sioner has pointed out that their effect may be mitigated in sone circumstances
where they might otherwise be harsh and arbitrary. 4 Specifically, Treasury Reg-
ulation § 20.2053-3(d) (2) prevents hardship to the estate by allowing in
instances where there is a loss in the sale of the shares a deduction as an admin-
istrative expense to the extent of the loss.5
The Supreme Court in Cartwright did not find the Government's "bundle
of rights" theory persuasive. First, the same bundle of rights inherent in mutual
funds can be found in any corporate security; yet, mutual funds are the only
ones valued at an "unrealistic" replacement cost which includes commissions
while other stocks are valued without regard to such commissions. " Second, the
Supreme Court contended that valuation of mutual fund shares was not nearly
as difficult as insurance policies since the value could readily be calculated on any
given day.
5 7
IND. & COM. L. Rxv., supra note 10, at 140. See also Duke v. Comm'r. 200 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953); Publicker v. Comm'r, 206 F.2d 250 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 974 (1953).
50 Comment, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rnv., supra note 10, at 140.
51 Estate of Wells v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 871, 877 (1968); accord, Howell v. United States,
414 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1969).
52 411 U.S. at 560.
53 Comment, 10 HousT. L. Rzv., supra note 20, at 469-70.
54 Estate of Wells v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 871, 877 (1968); see Comment, 10 HousT.
L. REv., supra note 20, at 472.
55 Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) (1965) provides in part: "Expenses for selling property of
the estate are deductible if the sale is necessary in order to pay the decedents' debts, expenses
of administration, or taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution." See Estate of
Huntington v. Comm'r, 36 B.T.A. 698 (1937). The value of shares in an ongoing activ-
ity is not solely dependent upon the liquidation value of its assets. Commissioner v. McCann,
146 F.2d 385, 385-86 (2d Cir. 1944).
56 411 U.S. at 556.
57 Id. at 555-56; see also Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1972) to
the effect that:
We cannot equate the valuation of shares in a mutual fund with the necessarily
abstract valuation of a single-premium life insurance policy. On any given day, the
net value of the mutual fund may be computed exactly.
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Mutual funds can also be distinguished from insurance policies in terms of
transferability; the former is most often redeemed by the mutual fund while the
latter may be easily assigned at a negotiated price in the ordinary course of
business.5" Further, these single-premium insurance policy cases may be in-
terpreted as holding only that replacement cost may be one factor used in de-
termining fair market value; it is not necessarily conclusive.5" The district court
in Cartwright noted yet another flaw in the analogy of the single-premium life
insurance policies, "[W]hen a death occurs, the insurance company pays under
the policy, the tax is paid, and that is the end of it. Mutual fund shares can
pass from estate to estate with a tax paid on each transfer." ' The result is a
repetitive tax on a value which does not exist.8 ' Finally, even the mitigating
provision of Treasury Regulation § 20.2053(d) (2) is of no benefit if there is
any gain on the sale or if there is no sale by the estate.62 The court also observed,
"[i]f the regulation setting fair market value is unreasonable, this unreasonable-
ness cannot be cured by a regulation which limits the hardship upon the tax-
payer. "s
C. Restrictive Stock Agreement Analogy
In noting the similarities between mutual fund shares and other corporate
securities, especially listed stock, some courts have argued that the fund contract
arrangements should be treated similarly to restrictive stock purchase agreements
because of the compulsory nature of the redemption price in a resale back to the
fund." The chief distinction between corporate stock and mutual fund shares in
terms of valuation appears to be that commissions are not included in the quoted
price for the former but are included in the ask price for the latter.6" A restrictive
stock purchase agreement is one in which the shares are subject to a binding
restriction that they may not be sold without first being offered to a specific
party at a specified price.66 Assuming that the transaction is at arm's length, the
Treasury regulations will value the stock for estate tax purposes at the price
specified in the restrictive agreement. 67 The taxpayers urge that a similar ap-
proach be adopted for mutual fund shares with the redemption price being the
one used for valuation.
The Government argued that the restrictive stock agreement analogy is not
appropriate because the mutual fund shareholder is not required to sell his
shares back to the fund.8 Further, the option here, unlike the situation with the
58 Comment, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rav., supra note 10, at 141.
59 Report of the Committee on Estate and Gift Taxes, 19 ABA TAXATION SECTION No. 4,
at 74 (1966).
60 323 F. Supp. at 773.
61 Note, 21 BUFPrALO L. Rv., supra note 41, at 262.
62 Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 773 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
63 Id.
64 Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 571 (2d Cir. 1972); Estate of Wells v.
Comm'r, 50 T.C. 871, 878 (1968) '(dissenting opinion).
65 Note, 6 CREIGHTON L. REV., supra note 8, at 89, citing the Brief of the Appellee in
Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1972).
66 Comment, 14 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rav., supra note 10, at 143.
67 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
68 Wilkins, 39 J. TAXATION, supra note 4, at 3.
(February 19741
restrictive stock agreement, belongs to the shareholder rather than the mutual
fund. 9 Nor has there been a definite price set in the arrangement."
The Supreme Court felt that the restrictive stock agreement analogy was
appropriate because the stocks were held subject to a restriction:
Those shares may not be "sold" at the public offering price. By statute
they may be "sold" back to the fund only at the redemption price. We see
no valid justification for disregarding this reality connected with the owner-
ship of mutual fund shares.7'
D. The Argument for Realizable Value
The heart of the taxpayer's objection to Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-
8(b) can be summarized as follows: Fair market valuation includes a number
of considerations and not solely the retail price. In the case of mutual fund
shares the decedent's estate can realistically expect to receive only the net asset
value of the shares upon disposition, not the price the general public would have
to pay for them. As a Colorado district court commented in Hicks v. United
States:
This regulation (§ 20.2031-8(b)), which is of 1963 origin, must be read
against the basic concept (that) valuations are based on fair market value
as is emphasized by the older § 20.2031-1 of the regulations, and the gov-
erment's problem, simply stated, is to justify a regulation which taxes
mutual fund shares at a value higher than any owner can realistically
expect to receive for them.
73
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sought to further bolster the argument
for realizable value through its extrapolation of Sections 2031 and 2033 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Section 2031 (a) provides that the value of the estate
will include any property owned by the decedent at the time of death. 5 Section
2033 further provides this value will include all property to the extent of the
decedent's interest in the property at the time of death.7 ' The effect of these
two sections has been that "any property in which the decedent had an interest
at the time of his death will be included in the gross estate."77 The Davis court
thought that the sales load in a mutual fund transaction could not be an interest
69 Comment, 14 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv., supra note 10, at 144.
70 Id.
71 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 554 (1973).
72 Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 572 (2d Cir. 1972). One commentator has
suggested that much of the controversy and confusion could be avoided if the Commissioner
and the courts concentrated on ascertaining the shares' "worth" rather than their difficult-to-
define "fair market value," i.e., what the shares would be "worth" to the estate. Note, Under
Treasury Regulation Section 20.2031-8(b), Value of Shares in Mutual Funds Is Public Offer-
ing Price on Date of Death Rather Than Redemption Price, 22 VAND. L. R~v. 429, 433
(1969).
73 335 F. Supp. at 477.
74 Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1972).
75 INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2031(a).
76 Ir. REv. COD OF 1954, § 2033.
77 Comment, 10 HousT. L. REv., supra note 20, at 466; see Davis v. United States, 460
F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1972).
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of the shareholder any more than would a broker's commission in the ordinary
corporate stock transaction:
The sales load is a charge for service which is paid by the buyer at purchase
and never recovered. It adds nothing to the value of the shares and does
not thereafter constitute an element in computing actual worth. To apply
the estate tax to the sales charge paid is to impose a tax on a non-existent
"interest of the decedent."
78
The dissenting opinion in Estate of Wells v. Commissioner also argued for
a realizable value approach when it observed that if the open-market price of
United States Government bonds is less than par, but the bonds can be applied
at par in payment of the taxes owed by the decedent's estate, the par value is in-
cludible in the gross estate. 9 Since the bonds could be redeemed at par in pay-
ment of estate taxes, they are worth more than the discounted price in the open
market."0 It would seem that the willingness of the Government to depart from
market price in favor of realizable value in these bond situations would strengthen
the taxpayer's argument for realizable value and give an indication of the possible
arbitrariness of Regulation § 20.2031-8 (b)."'
The Supreme Court also felt itself compelled to accept the taxpayer's argu-
ment for realizable value, noting somewhat wryly that it had "the clear ring of
common sense" to it.8" Further,
[T]he only price that a shareholder may realize and that the fund-the
only buyer-will pay is the redemption price. In the teeth of this fact,
Regulation § 20.2031-8(b) purports to assign a value to mutual fund shares
that the estate could not hope to obtain and that the fund could not offer8s
The Court felt that such a valuation method was inconsistent with estab-
lished Treasury practices and possibly contrary with the principles of valuation in
the Internal Revenue Code. 4 In line with the Davis court and the lower Cart-
wright courts, the Supreme Court took issue with the Commissioner's attempt to
include a commission in the "hypothetical purchase" of mutual fund shares
already held by the estate, arguing that such logic (if applied to the corporate
stock transaction) would require a share selling at $100 to be valued at $102
so as to include the fee that a person buying the stock on the day of the decedent's
death would have had to pay.8"
The Court found further evidence of the unrealistic nature of Treasury
Regulation § 20.2031-8(b) when it compared the Commissioner's treatment of
"load" funds with that afforded "no-load" funds. Even assuming that there
78 460 F.2d at 771. Both the district court and the court of appeals in Cartwright inter-
preted the sales load as a device for paying advertising marketing expenses. 'Cartwright v.
United States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 773 (W.D.N.Y. 1971); 457 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1972).
79 50 T.C. at 878, citing Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 903 (1961).
80 Id. at 878-79.
81 Note, 23 VAND. L. REv., supra note 43, at 901.
82 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973).
83 Id. at 552-53.
84 Id. at 553.
85 Id.
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were significant differences between mutual fund shares and corporate stocks,
there are no such distinctions between "load" and "no-load" funds, except for
the sales- charge of the former; yet, a share in a "no-load" fund is valued at its
net asset value while a share in a "load" fund is valued at its net asset value plus
sales charges."8
The Supreme Court was not completely agreed that the regulation was un-
reasonable and unrealistic. The dissent noted that a number of assets have been
taxed for estate tax purposes on amounts in excess of what the estate could
realistically realize from the sale of the assets; e.g., real property is taxed at fair
market value even though the estate will usually have to pay some proportion of
the amount in broker's fees if it decides to sell the property."7 Similarly, if the
estate wants to sell securities, it will normally pay a commission on the sale and
have to deduct the charge from the amount realized on the sale; yet, if it were
selling mutual fund shares, it would pay no commissions."
E. The Presumption of the Validity of Treasury Regulations
Even when one has considered all the pros and cons of the Commissioner's
position on the valuation of mutual fund shares for estate tax purposes, the
Commissioner still has one more argument working in his favor-the presump-
tion of the validity of Treasury regulations. The Supreme Court acknowledged
this situation when it noted that Congress, through the Secretary of the Treasury,
administers the tax laws and that the rules the Treasury Department formulates
must be upheld if they implement Congressional directives in a reasonable man-
ner. " In speaking to this issue in 1948 in Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber
Co., the Supreme Court said, "[t]reasury regulations must be sustained unless
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes."" The Court
attempted to define the judicial function in regard to administrative construction
of the tax statutes in the case United States v. Correll:
But we do not sit as a committee of revision to perfect the administration
of the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner, not to the
courts, the task of prescribing "all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a)."1
The Commissioner's position is even stronger in light of the general rule
that where there are several possible methods of valuation, any permissible one
selected by the Commissioner may not be set aside.Y Thus, if it appeared that
there was a reasonable basis for both the bid and ask price bases of valuation of
86 Id. at 556.
87 Id. at 561 (dissenting opinion).
88 Id. at 562 (dissenting opinion).
89 Id. at 550; United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967); see also Bingler v.
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496
(1948).
90 333 U.S. at 501.
91 389 U.S. at 306-07.
92 Dupont's Estate v. Comm'r, 233 F.2d 210, 214 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
878 (1956); see also Mearkle's Estate v. Comm'r, 129 F.2d 386, 388-89 (3rd Cir. 1942).
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mutual fund shares, the courts were willing to defer to the Commissioner to
choose a method reasonable and consistent with the revenue laws." In short, it
need not be good as long as it is reasonable.
9 4
Notwithstanding the presumption of the validity of Treasury regulations,
the Supreme Court held that Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8(b) was incon-
sistent and unreasonable and therefore affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeals."5 It endorsed the view expressed in the dissent of Wells that simply
because the Commissioner has a choice of alternatives, this does not mean his
selection should be validated where the alternative selected is unrealistic; rather,
the regulation stipulating that alternative should be held to be unreasonable. 6
There are probably at least three theoretical ways in which a regulation may
be unreasonable:
First, a regulation may be arbitrary or patently inconsistent with the general
terms of the statute under which it is promulgated. Second, it is possible
that a regulation, although reasonable on its own, is irreconcilable with
another regulation promulgated under the same statutory provision.
9 7
Third, the regulation may conflict with existing legislation in a related field. The
Supreme Court in Cartwright indicated that this third explanation was the most
compelling, but that the first proposition was also an important consideration as
well:
But even if the Regulation contested here is not, on its face, technically in-
consistent with § 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code, it is manifestly incon-
sistent with the most elementary provisions of the Investment Company
Act of 1940 .... 9
The courts have also attacked the presumption of the validity of Treasury Regula-
tion § 20.2031-8(b) in a second, more subtle fashion, noting its lack of con-
temporaneity and consistency with Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-1.
IV. § 25.2512-6(b) : The Companion Gift Tax Regulation
In 1963 the Commissioner formulated a gift tax regulation to govern the
valuation of gifts of mutual fund shares for gift tax purposes. Treasury Regula-
tion § 25.2512-6(b) was a virtual duplication of the estate tax regulation at issue
in Cartwright."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the gift tax
93 Ruehlmann v. Comm'r, 418 F.2d 1302, 1304 (6th Cir. 1969); Howell v. United
States, 414 F.2d 45, 48 (7th Cir. 1969).
94 Comment, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. RaV., supra note 10, at 147.
95 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973).
96 Id. at 557; see also Estate of Wells v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 871, 878 (1968).
97 Comment, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. supra note 31, at 416 n.19.
98 411 U.S. at 557.
99 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-6(b) (1963) provides in part:
The fair market value of a share in an open-end investment company (commonly
known as a "mutual fund") is the public offering price of a share, adjusted for any
reduction in price available to the public in acquiring the number of shares included
in the particular gift.
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regulation in Howell v. United States, saying that a gift of shares of a mutual
fund was properly valued for federal gift tax purposes on the basis of the public
offering price."' The reasoning followed by the Howell court was virtually
identical to that of the Tax Court in Wells and the sixth circuit in Ruehlmann.
First, the court held that the public offering price was the most appropriate
measure in terms of the willing buyer-willing seller criterion." 1 Second, it agreed
that the Guggenheim decision supported the Commissioner's position that valua-
tion of mutual fund shares in terms of their public offering or replacement cost
was permissible. 2 Finally, the Howell court noted that its decision coincided with
the estate tax valuation determination made by the Tax Court in Wells, adding
that the "estate and gift tax laws should be construed in pari materia in absence
of a clear expression of Congressional intent to the contrary."'103
V. Conclusions
One practical short-run consideration to flow from the Cartwright decision
is that for estates where the estate return has already been filed and the statute
of limitations has not run, a refund claim should be filed if the mutual fund
shares had been valued at the public offering price rather than the redemption
price.'" In addition, instructions to the federal estate tax return (Form 706)
have dropped the requirement that mutual fund shares must be valued at the
ask price.' It would also seem that the companion gift tax regulation upheld
in Howell would now also be in jeopardy since its rationale is virtually identical
with that of the now invalidated estate tax regulation.
As one writer has observed, the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari
to resolve the valuation controversy in Cartwright was made partly to bring about
a uniform method of valuation that could be applied in the three contexts of
taxation---estate, gift, and income.' Even though the decision went against the
Government, this does not change the fact there would still be benefits to be
derived from the uniform method of valuation.
10r
It has also been suggested that decisions such as Cartwright represent a set-
back to the Government's efforts to establish retail price, when available, as the
presumptive measure of value for estate tax purposes and perhaps even for
retail price valuation in general.0" As noted earlier, Treasury Regulation §
20.2031-1 (b) had been amended in 1965 in an attempt to establish retail price
as a presumptive measure of fair market value in a general context. " However,
100 Howell v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 45 (7th
Cir. 1969).
101 414 F.2d at 48.
102 Id. at 48-49.
103 Id. at 49; see Merrill v. Falis, 324 U.S. 308, 311-13 (1945).
104 Thatcher, 48 L.A.B. BULL., supra note 36, at 30 (1972).
105 Instructions to Form 706 (Rev. April 1973).
106 Wilkins, 39 J. TAXAkTiON, supra note 4, at 3.
107 Id. at 5.
108 Note, Mutual Fund Shares Must Be Valued for Estate Tax Purposes at Net Asset Value
Rather Than Public Offering Price, 86 HAv. L. REv. 629, 630-31 (1973).
109 See note 27 supra; see also Note, 86 HAnv. L. Rv., supra note 108, at 631.
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the Government had limited its efforts at enforcement to mutual fund shares."10
Although the Supreme Court did not rule out the possibility that there might be
situations where it would be realistic and appropriate under the Regulation to,
use the retail price approach, it declined to suggest any situations where this
method would be permissible. 1 ' Further, the second circuit, determining that
the retail price standard of the 1965 amendment conflicted with the older valua-
tion provisions of § 20.2031-1(b), ruled that the true method of value was the
use of all relevant facts."'
The Cartwright decision may also have an impact upon valuation disputes
in areas other than mutual funds, for example, automobiles. The executor of a
decedent's estate might argue that there are two separate automobile markets:
(1) individuals selling to dealers, and (2) dealers reselling to the general public
after first adding on their expenses and profit margins (the equivalent of a
mutual fund's "sales load")."' These dealers represent the most realistic market
for resale and their "mark-up" or "sales load" becomes an amount which would
never be realized by the decedent's estate." 4 The difficulty with this argument
is that the markets for automobiles and other household and personal effects are
far more fragmented than for mutual fund shares, making retail price or realiz-
able value more difficult to determine with accuracy."5s Thus, the Commissioner
might reasonably select any one of these methods of valuation." 6 In any case,
the Cartwright case would seem to bode well for future taxpayer efforts to obtain
valuations based on realizable value in situations other than mutual funds, at
least in those instances where their arguments have "the clear ring of common
sense" behind them.
Phil Lauro
110 Note, 86 HARv. L. Rav., supra note 108, at 631, citing Brief for Appellee at 21-24,
Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1972).
111 Cartwright v. United States, 411 U.S. 546, 553 n.8 (1973).
112 Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 572 (2d Cir. 1972) ; see Note, 6 CREIGHTON
L. REv., supra note 8, at 82.
113 Wilkins, 39 J. TAXATON, supra note 4, at 5.
114 Id.
115 Note, 86 HARv. L. RPv., supra note 108, at 631-32 n.24.
116 Wilkins, 39 J. TAxAxoN, supra note 4, at 5.
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